By Emma Chanlett-Avery
Scheduled for September in the Solomon Islands, the 2025 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Meeting was expected to serve as a key test for U.S-Pacific Islands relations.
However, recent developments indicate that the U.S—along with China and other external partners—are no longer invited. Solomon Islands has restricted attendance to PIF member countries only, a move seemingly aimed at sidestepping mounting tensions over Taiwan’s participation. How the U.S responds, and whether it continues to support regional priorities despite its exclusion, will be critical in shaping its long-term position in the Pacific Islands region.
Navigating External Partners’ Attendance at the PIF Leaders Meeting
As the region’s premier political and economic body, the PIF brings together 18 members to build consensus, address shared challenges, and amplify the Pacific’s voice on the global stage. The U.S has traditionally participated as a Dialogue Partner in select PIF meetings, and its engagement has deepened in recent years: in 2019, Secretary of the Interior David Bernhardt attended the PIF Dialogue Partners Meeting; in 2022, Vice President Kamala Harris addressed it virtually; and in 2024, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell attended in-person.
However, the key flashpoint shaping the current exclusion decision is Taiwan’s status within the PIF. Recognised as a PIF ‘development partner’ since 1992, Taiwan’s status has become increasingly contentious. In 2024, China’s Special Envoy to the Pacific, Qian Bo, reportedly pressured the PIF Secretariat to remove all references to Taiwan from the PIF Leaders Meeting communiqué, raising concerns about China’s influence. Despite this pressure, the PIF’s official position on Taiwan’s development partner status remains unchanged.
The Solomon Islands, which switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 2019, has become a key player in this evolving dynamic. Earlier this year, it denied visas to Taiwanese officials seeking to conduct a scoping mission and refused to confirm whether Taiwan would be invited to the meeting. However, excluding only Taiwan risked backlash from PIF members that maintain diplomatic recognition, including Palau, Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands. Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr warned, “I’d hate that to be a divisive issue that causes PIF to split.”
In response, the Solomon Islands has landed on a diplomatic workaround: restricting participation to PIF members only. While this approach sacrifices a valuable opportunity for Pacific Island leaders to engage with external partners, it may help preserve fragile PIF unity, which is still recovering from the 2021 withdrawal of its Micronesian members, later reversed but not without cost to trust within the grouping.
Given the sensitivity of the situation, a measured U.S response is essential. Preserving PIF unity must remain the top priority. The U.S should be guided by the other 17 PIF members’ reactions to the Solomon Islands decision. At the PIF Foreign Ministers Meeting in August, following “comprehensive discussion”, all Ministers noted the Solomon Island’s decision to restrict attendance to PIF Members only. A heavy-handed U.S approach – out of step with this decision – risks undermining regional consensus, and damaging both credibility and trust, particularly given the Trump administration’s decision to deny Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te’s transit through the U.S. and a broader range of policy decisions that have already drawn scrutiny.
Indeed, the U.S enters this moment with a credibility gap. The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement disregarded repeated warnings from PIF Leaders that climate change is an existential threat. The closure of the USAID office in Fiji and the termination of key development programs disrupted critical support for climate finance, disaster response, digital connectivity, and private sector growth, amongst other things. The merger of USAID into the State Department further complicated aid delivery. Under its “Liberation Day” agenda, steep tariffs were imposed, including 32% on Fiji, 30 percent on Nauru, and 23% percent on Vanuatu, though these have since been lowered. Tonga, Vanuatu, and Tuvalu were also threatened with U.S. travel bans. The damage of these decisions lingers.
What’s at Stake for the U.S in the PIF Leaders Meeting 2025 Agenda
Beyond tensions over attendance, the 2025 PIF Leaders Meeting will tackle several high-stakes agenda items with direct implications for U.S-Pacific Islands relations. These include governance of deep seabed mining, reform of the regional institutional architecture, and new efforts to manage intensifying strategic competition.
PIF leaders will consider options for a regional approach to governing deep seabed mining (DSM). The Clarion-Clipperton Zone and several Pacific Islands’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) contain some of the world’s richest seabed mineral deposits. Yet DSM remains deeply divisive. Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu have all expressed significant environmental concerns. Others such as the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga see DSM as a potential economic opportunity.
As global demand for critical minerals increases, the U.S is racing to diversify its supply chains and reduce dependence on China. At the same time, China has been moving assertively in the Pacific Islands region: in February, the Cook Islands signed a seabed minerals Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Beijing; in March, Kiribati also confirmed talks on “potential collaboration.”
Further complicating matters, a U.S executive order authorizing DSM beyond national jurisdictions, effectively bypassing the UN’s International Seabed Authority, risks alienating some Pacific leaders. As the U.S seeks to secure access to these resources, this unilateral move may have raised doubts about America’s respect for regional consensus-based decision making and undermines trust.
PIF leaders will also be reviewing the region’s governance architecture to determine whether current institutions can support the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent (the region’s long-term development agenda). This review will also evaluate the engagement of Dialogue Partners, including the U.S.
Currently, the U.S is a member of two regional organisations: the Pacific Community (SPC) and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP). Any changes in membership criteria, mandates, or institutional structures could reshape U.S involvement in the region. However, uncertainty over U.S. interest and focus in multilateral institutions is rife — President Trump signed another executive order mandating a review of U.S support for all international organisations. This has raised concerns about a potential U.S. withdrawal from SPC or SPREP. Such a move would hurt U.S credibility and signal a retreat from the region.
Heightening the stakes, the Dialogue Partner review proposes a new tiered system, classifying partners as either Tier 1 (strategic) or Tier 2 (development), each with differing privileges. This classification will serve as a barometer of how Pacific leaders view each partner’s commitment, putting U.S strategic standing under scrutiny.
Finally, PIF leaders will consider Fiji’s ‘Ocean of Peace’ proposal, which emphasises the need to manage strategic competition and prevent militarization, arms races, and nuclear threats in the region. This proposal could reignite concerns over China’s November 2024 missile test near French Polynesia’s EEZ. But it could also prompt renewed scrutiny of U.S actions, particularly AUKUS’ proposed nuclear-powered submarine transfers, the legacy of nuclear testing in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and unresolved WWII ordnance issues.
A Test of Staying Power: Why the Pacific Islands Still Matter to the U.S
Despite being excluded from the PIF Leaders Meeting, U.S. strategic interests in the Pacific Islands region remain significant. The region has emerged as a key theatre of U.S-China geostrategic competition. Spanning an oceanic area comparable in size to Asia, Europe, and North America combined, the Pacific Islands region sits along major maritime trade routes and within the second island chain, making it critical to both economic and homeland security. The twelve independent Pacific Island countries account for over 6 percent of votes in the United Nations, representing a meaningful diplomatic bloc. The region is also rich in natural resources, holding some of the world’s largest seabed mineral deposits and producing approximately 70 percent of the world’s commercially caught tuna.
Accordingly, the U.S cannot afford to disengage. While it may not have a seat at the PIF Dialogues Partners Meeting table this year, it must continue working closely with the PIF Secretariat and deepen bilateral engagement with PIF members. U.S credibility will be assessed by its willingness to respect regional consensus, align with Pacific Islands’ priorities, and demonstrate long-term commitment. In a contested strategic environment, influence must be earned, not assumed.
Emma Chanlett-Avery is the Director of Political-Security Affairs and Deputy Director, Washingon, D.C. Office
