New Zealand is considering the use of specific ‘strategic trust’ or national security clauses in agreements with Pacific Island nations, in an effort to counter China’s growing influence in the region.
Newsroom understands the Government is considering how to formalise – or codify – what it previously thought to be well-understood security responsibilities with its Pacific Island partners.
One of the options is including a sort of ‘strategic trust’ clause in future agreements, which would codify the country’s obligations to New Zealand’s national security, and the security of the wider region.
In recent years, there has been a steady trend towards some Pacific Island nations moving closer to China, and formalising these relationships through signing strategic partnerships with the Asian superpower. New Zealand, along with traditional partners like Australia and the U.S, fear it could compromise the security of the region and enable China’s progress towards its strategic intent to militarising the Pacific.
In 2022, Beijing signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, which allowed for Chinese police presence on the islands, ostensibly for training the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, the closest the country has to an army.
Australia saw this as the Solomon Islands leadership essentially disregarding the impact this agreement could have on the national security interests of its primary partner.
Since then, Australia has moved to add explicit clauses to agreements it signs with some Pacific Island nations, to stop a repeat of the Solomons deal, and to counter China’s growing influence.
In November 2023, Australia and Tuvalu signed the Falepili Union Treaty, which came into force in August last year.
This controversial treaty recognises Tuvalu’s continuing statehood and sovereignty, regardless of sea-level rise; and creates a special visa pathway to enable Tuvalu citizens to live, work and study in Australia.
In exchange, Tuvalu will “mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other state or entity on security and defence-related matters in Tuvalu”.
In December, a similar ‘strategic trust’ clause was inserted in Australia’s NRL deal with Papua New Guinea.
Anthony Albanese’s government agreed that Papua New Guinea would join the NRL in 2028, with Australia providing $600 million (US$381 million) over a decade to help make that a reality.
In return, Papua New Guinea agreed to sign what was described by the ABC as a “parallel” agreement on ‘strategic trust’ between the two countries. The deal is designed to stop China from gaining a significant security foothold in the Pacific country.
Now, as tensions rise and China seeks to get a foothold in the Pacific in order to access critical minerals and build strategically located dual-use infrastructure, New Zealand is looking at what options it has to protect its own national security interests.
The current issue with the Cook Islands has brought this into sharp focus, as Prime Minister Mark Brown travelled to Beijing last week to sign a comprehensive partnership agreement with New Zealand’s chief strategic adversary in the region.
The agreement hasn’t been seen by New Zealand, despite the free association status that means the Cook Islands is obligated to consult with New Zealand.
The Government, and Foreign Minister Winston Peters, has openly talked about the seriousness of the issue, which they see as both a security threat and a constitutional one. As well as the security risks that come with a deal that could potentially give access to the Cooks Islands’ vast critical minerals resources and allow China access to strategic infrastructure in the South Pacific, it could also impact New Zealand’s relationships with traditional partners like Australia and the U.S.
Newsroom understands this is one of six Pacific Island issues (along with the continued snubs from Kiribati President Taneti Maamau) that Peters discussed with his Australian counterpart Penny Wong last Wednesday.
While Peters and his officials are keeping their cards close to their chest regarding the next move with the Cook Islands – a unique and serious issue given the nature of the Cooks’ obligations under the ‘free association’ arrangement – they will be looking at how to avoid these situations with other Pacific Island nations in the future.
Newsroom understands that as part of that thinking, New Zealand is paying close attention to moves made by its only formal ally and closest partner in explicitly requiring the final say over agreements impacting national security. However, New Zealand does not have the same sized coffers or influence in the region, so the Government and diplomats may have to think more creatively.
Australian National University Pacific Affairs expert James Batley told Newsroom these clauses were the latest step in Australia’s long-running efforts to convince Pacific Island countries that they were all part of a “shared security community” in the region.
“Yes, they’re independent countries; they’re free to take decisions, but they don’t take decisions in a vacuum.”
And those decisions taken by Pacific Island countries could affect Australia’s (or New Zealand’s) national interests, he said.
Given Australia’s importance to these nations as a security partner and development funder, the federal government had been trying to convince other countries to take its interests into account when doing their own national security policymaking, Batley said.
These new agreements were a way of ensuring – or codifying – that.
New Zealand would have a harder time taking this approach, he said.
New Zealand was smaller, had less in the way of development money to spend, and in some cases had already “given the game away” in that people from countries like the Cook Islands (as well as Tokelau and Niue) had access to New Zealand through their constitutional arrangements – so, what did New Zealand have left to offer as leverage?
In the case of the Cook Islands, Batley said Brown was in over his head and it was unclear whether his government really understood the implications of its decision to sign an agreement with China.
But more broadly, it would be crucial for New Zealand to intensify dialogue in the Pacific and strengthen the no surprises principle – something Winston Peters was clearly aware of given he has already visited every Pacific Island nation, other than Kiribati, since taking up the reins.
“You can’t just sign an agreement and expect that solves your problem,” Batley said. “You just have to keep working on this. As new politicians get elected, new officials come into the system and rise up. So you cannot assume that they have internalised these previous understandings, or that they’re happy with the formal agreements that have been signed.”
New Zealand and Australia were trying to frame the Pacific region as a community, in which countries needed to keep each other’s interests in mind, he said.
While there were good examples of this working in the past in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea during times of conflict, this notion of community was being put under threat by Beijing.
University of Canterbury Pro-Vice Chancellor Pacific and director of the Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies Steven Ratuva had a different view of these arrangements.
While Batley believed the terms of these agreements had been well-received by Pacific Island nations, Ratuva said Pacific countries saw Australia as “arrogant, as being very paternalistic, very colonial” in their attitude. These new agreements and ‘strategic trust’ clauses were the latest example of that.
While Australia was a significant development partner, there had been criticism of “boomerang aid” that benefited Australian and New Zealand contractors, and a desire by a big nation to try and buy Pacific Island nations’ loyalty in a transactional way, Ratuva said.
Signing agreements and throwing money at Pacific nations would not lead to loyalty or a genuine partnership, he said, adding that while New Zealand had greater respect than the likes of the US and Australia, some of that mana had been lost.
That loss of respect, mana and genuine partnership left a gap, and had something to do with countries’ desire to move closer to China.
Ratuva said China took a more strategic approach.
“They can be arrogant as well. They have been quite imposing. At the same time, they have a more long-term view, and they can manipulate in ways which you may not feel, but it’s happening.”
Each larger player had its own way of manipulating smaller players, he said, adding that while China was more implicit, New Zealand and Australia were more explicit.
Mana could only be restored through people-to-people relationships, he said.
“It cannot be restored using money. It cannot be restored using formal agreements. Because those kinds of formal agreements – like Australia has done with countries in the Pacific – has very, very strong neo-colonial overtones.”
Ratuva said these ‘strategic trust’ clauses were a way of colonial (or former colonial) powers “formally re-controlling” those countries.
“When bureaucrats in government begin to think in terms of the kind of foreign policy control … that’s not good for good regional relationships.”
If New Zealand wanted to restore its mana, respect, and ability to discuss the security of the whole region as a trusted partner, it would need to use people-to-people engagement to achieve that, or risk pushing Pacific countries into China’s arms.
And with that in mind, Peters and his team would no doubt remain open-minded as to how to restore the Cook Islands relationship and ‘de-risk’ the agreement with China, while also thinking about their next move in the Pacific.
